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I. REIMBURSEMENT-AN OVERVIEW
A husband and wife divorce, ending years of arguing and
emotional roller coasters. Unfortunately, the real fight has not
even begun. After the judge enters the divorce judgment, each
spouse uses portions of the community property and awaits
partition. The wife retains a car and a house as she begins to make
a new life for herself, no longer part of a duo. She has never
worked outside the home and does not even have a college
education. Now, she is forced to support herself and her children
on minimum wage and monthly child support payments. Soon, the
mortgage on the house and the car note fall due.' In an effort to
prevent foreclosure and repossession, she pays both community
notes out of her salary-separate property-but does not have
enough to make ends meet this month. She hopes for
reimbursement from her husband for half her expenses, but none
comes because of the type of property related to the obligation and
timing of payments, the source of a circuit split among Louisiana
courts. Unable to sustain the notes, she gives up both house and
car to her husband in a settlement to alleviate her burden. She and
the children then move to a small apartment and she continues to
Copyright 2007, by LOuIsIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Though the couple is divorced, this debt is still a community obligation
because the property has not yet been judicially partitioned. LA. Civ. CODE ANN.
arts. 2360, 2361 (2007). This obligation is presumed to be a community
obligation because it was incurred during the existence of the community for the
common interest of the spouses. The property, upon which that debt was incurred,
has not yet been judicially partitioned; therefore, it is still co-owned, and each
spouse is liable for the debt.
2. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2341 (2007) (indicating what property is
separate). Salary is generally considered community property because they are
acquired through the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse; however, this is
only applicable during the existence of the legal regime. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art.
2338 (2007). Therefore, the salary obtained after the termination of the legal
regime is separate property.
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carve out a living-struggling but surviving. Such is the harsh
reality of many divorces. What can be done to protect this woman
and other spouses like her who use their separate funds to pay
community obligations?
The prevalence of divorces in the United States is increasing
dramatically.3 The marriage rate is currently 7.5 per 1,000 total
population.4 However, the current rate of divorce in the United
States is an astounding 3.6 per 1,000 total population. 5 Based on
these statistics, chances are great that many of us will face a
grueling trip to family court. Unfortunately, the family court's task
is not an easy one. In the midst of a private emotional battle
between a husband and wife, a public legal battle is waged in the
courtroom. The job of the court is to sort through the broken
pieces of this union, undo, and repair. To do this, the court must
attempt to separate lives that have become intertwined-to
untangle the untangleable.
Because Louisiana is a community property state,6 the court's
task is further complicated. The central notions of mutuality and
sharing imposed by the community property regime7 create
complications as spouses are tied together financially, almost
inextricably. Such complications of the community property
system could easily be avoided if the spouses contracted for a
separate property regime. 8 However, this is not a practical solution
for many living in community property states. Often, spouses
without the benefit of a legal education are not cognizant of state
laws concerning marriage. They simply do not realize that
contracting for a separate property regime is possible before
marriage. Also, many couples do not possess the financial
3. Kenneth J. Rigby, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 44 LA. L. REV. 1725,
1725-26 (1984).
4. Center for Disease Control, National Center for Health Statistics:
Marriage and Divorce, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/divorce.htm (last visited
August 9,2007).
5. Id. (including 46 reporting States and D.C.).
6. KATHERINE S. SPAHT & ANDREA B. CARROLL, LOuISIANA MATRIMONIAL
REGIMES 1 (2006).
7. HARRIErr SPILLER DAGGETI, THE COMMuNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM OF
LOuIsIANA 234 (1945).
8. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2328 (2007).
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resources to seek legal advice or properly execute the required
documentation to establish the separate property regime.
9
Therefore, few people will pursue the separate property regime,
and most spouses are left with the community property system
already in place along with its inherent complications.
The Louisiana community property regime's scheme of
reimbursement, l0 in particular, is a complicated maze that
Louisiana courts must navigate in separating spouses. The right of
reimbursement upon the termination of the community is the major
vehicle in Louisiana for adjusting claims between spouses, as it
lessens the economic burden imposed on one spouse when he or
she pays a debt for which he or she should not be held solely
responsible.'l The notion of reimbursement may seem elementary;
however, this ostensibly simple concept has wrought serious
controversy in the courts and legislature since its adoption in 1978.
The Louisiana reimbursement scheme provides, in part, that "if
community property has been used to satisfy a separate obligation
of a spouse, the other spouse is entitled to reimbursement upon the
termination of the community property regime for one-half the
amount of the value that the property had at the time it was
used." 12 Thus, assume a Louisiana husband purchased a car or
9. In Louisiana, a matrimonial agreement may be executed by the spouses
before or during marriage. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2331 (2007). It shall be made
by authentic act or by an act under private signature duly acknowledged by the
spouses. Id. Spouses may enter into a matrimonial agreement that modifies or
terminates a matrimonial regime during marriage only upon joint petition and a
finding by the court that this serves their best interests and that they understand the
governing principles and rules. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2329 (2007).
10. Reimbursement is repayment and indemnification. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1312 (8th ed. 2004). A spouse may have a claim against the other
spouse for reimbursement upon the termination of the community property
regime. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2358 (2007).
11. Katherine S. Spaht & Cynthia Samuel, Equal Management Revisited:
1979 Legislative Modifications of the 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Law, 40 LA. L.
REV. 83, 141 (1979). Reimbursement is paid from the patrimony of the spouse
who owes reimbursement. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2358.1 (2007). This occurs
because the reimbursement claim is a claim by one spouse against the other, rather
than a claim against the community. KATHERINE S. SPAHT & RICHARD D.
MORENO, MATRIMONIAL REGIMES § 7.13, in 16 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE
560 (3d ed. 2007).
12. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2364 (2007).
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home before marriage and took out a loan to finance the purchase
price. Even if, after marrying and establishing a community
property regime, the wife uses her earnings (community
property)' 3 to pay the loan payments, the wife will have no
ownership interest in the car or home. 14 Louisiana's classification
scheme classifies property primarily at the time of acquisition.'
5
The contribution of funds of a different character later is irrelevant
for classification purposes.' 6  In Louisiana, the remedy for the
13. Property acquired during the marriage through the effort, skill, or industry
of a spouse is community property. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2338 (2007). This is
generally true of earnings; therefore, earnings are community property. See
generally Paxton v. Bramlette, 228 So. 2d 161 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970) (holding
that a wife's salary was community income).
14. See infra note 16. Louisiana rejects the buy-into title theory whereby the
wife using community funds as payment on the husband's separate obligation
would give herself an ownership interest in his property.
15. SPAHT &CARROLL, supra note 6, at 28.
16. In applying principles that refuse an ownership interest to a spouse who
contributes by making payments, Louisiana is different from many of the other
community property states because it advocates a reimbursement rather than buy-
into-title theory. California is one state that uses buy-into-title to resolve claims
and propounds that:
[W]here community funds are used to make payments on property
purchased by one of the spouses before marriage "the rule developed
through decisions in California gives to the community a pro tanto
community property interest in such property in the ratio that the
payments on the purchase price with community funds bear to the
payments made with separate funds.
In re Marriage of Moore, 618 P.2d 208, 210 (1980) (quoting Forbes v. Forbes, 257
P.2d 721, 722 (1953)). Nevada employs another version of the buy-into-title
theory that is not based on the amount of principal reduction attributable to each
monthly mortgage payment. WILLIAM A. REPPY & CYNTHIA SAMUEL,
COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (2000). Credit for the unpaid
balance on the obligation is assigned pro rata according to a time rule based upon
the total number of monthly payments made from separate or community
property. Id. at 9-10. Arizona uses a combination reimbursement and buy-into-
title theory and holds that, for example, if community funds are used to make
mortgage payments after an initial separate property acquisition, the amount of
reimbursement owed to the community upon termination is the same value as the
community's actual interest in the property at the time of dissolution. Id
Clearly, the buy-into-title theory has many different variations, some
employing reimbursement concepts; however, Louisiana does not use this theory
because of its potentially unfair results. For example, if the community makes a
single payment on the husband's property purchased before marriage, then the
[Vol. 68
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wife's contribution is reimbursement rather than an ownership
interest in the husband's car or house. 17 Under article 2364 of the
Louisiana Civil Code, the wife may get back one-half of the funds
she paid.
However, the real problems concerning reimbursement have
come not with reimbursement of community funds used to satisfy a
separate obligation, but rather with the counterpart concept of
reimbursement when one spouse uses his separate funds to satisfy
a community obligation. Article 2365 states: "If separate property
of a spouse has been used to satisfy a community obligation, that
spouse, upon termination of the community property regime, is
entitled to reimbursement for one-half of the amount or value that
the property had at the time it was used.",18 This very language
implies that one spouse is theoretically and equitably responsible
for only one-half of a community obligation. For instance, if wife
uses her separate funds (saved before marriage or acquired by
inheritance) 9 to pay a community loan on a house or car, she
should be able to see a return of one-half of the payments upon
termination of the community property regime. This is because
she has paid a community debt owed by both spouses. 2 This core
concept of equalizing the economic burden of payment seems
rather straightforward, but in light of recent misinterpretations of
article 2365, the wife, who paid the debt for which both parties
were accountable, may get nothing, either because of the timing of
the payment or because of the type of underlying property on
which the debt was paid.
Controversy over article 2365 has raged since its adoption in
1980. Twenty-seven years later, the controversy remains
wife will have an ownership interest in that property. One inconsequential
payment should not give the wife an ownership interest in property on which the
husband has been making the majority of payments. One of the central premises
underlying community property is to provide equitable results to spouses; the buy-
into title theory does not accomplish that goal. Therefore, Louisiana seeks fairer
remedies by opting for pure reimbursement principles.
17. See supra note 16.
18. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2365 (2007).
19. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2341 (2007).
20. See art. 2365.
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powerful, and the Louisiana Supreme Court still has not addressed
the circumstances under which reimbursement for satisfaction of a
community obligation with separate funds is available. The time
has come for the court to step in and resolve the competing views
in the Louisiana circuits over the proper circumstances for
reimbursement under article 2365. The purpose of this comment is
to serve as a guide for this resolution by addressing the totality of
the jurisprudential confusion regarding when a spouse may obtain
reimbursement for separate property used to satisfy a community
obligation.
The various Louisiana circuit courts have employed several
strained interpretations of the right to reimbursement for the use of
separate funds to satisfy a community obligation. Some courts
have held that one must distinguish between the type of property
related to the community obligation-movable or immovable-
and allow reimbursement only for payments made on immovable
property.2 1  Other courts have hinged the availability of
reimbursement on the timing of the payment.22 As a derivative of
this theory, some Louisiana courts have held that reimbursement is
available only for payments made before termination of the legal
regime, thus disallowing reimbursement for payments made after
the termination of the marriage, but before the partition of the
community property.23 Others, on the contrary, have allowed all
21. See, e.g., Mason v. Mason, 927 So. 2d 1235 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2006)
(holding that a wife was entitled to reimbursement for the use of her separate
funds to pay the mortgage on the family home, but that she was not entitled to
reimbursement for payments on a car note); Sheridon v. Sheridon, 867 So. 2d 38
(La. App. 3d Cir. 2004) (holding that a wife could not get reimbursement for
expenses spent on the purchase of a car); Davezac v. Davezac, 483 So. 2d 1197
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1986) (holding that a husband was entitled to reimbursement for
payments made on the family home after termination of the community regime,
but that he was not entitled for reimbursement for clothing and payments made on
a car note.); Gachez v. Gachez, 451 So. 2d 608 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984) (holding
that a husband was entitled to reimbursement for payments made on a house
mortgage, but not for payments of a car).
22. See, e.g., Sheridon, 867 So. 2d 38; Bergeron v. Bergeron, 693 So. 2d 199
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1997); Davezac, 483 So. 2d 1197; Moody v. Moody, 622 So. 2d
1381 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993); Bordelon v. Bordelon, 942 So. 2d 708 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 2006).
23. See, e.g., Sheridon, 867 So. 2d 38; Bergeron, 693 So. 2d 199; Bordelon,
942 So. 2d 708.
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post-termination payments, as long as they were made pre-partition
of community property.
24
Ultimately, the statutory and scholarly authority, along with
equity and public policy, demand that the spouse who satisfies a
community obligation with separate funds should be reimbursed
even if payment was made after termination of the community
property regime (as long as it was made pre-partition of property).
Courts should not refuse reimbursement because the payment was
not made during the existence of the community or draw a
distinction between an obligation related to movables and one
related to immovables. The wealth of Louisiana jurisprudence
indicating otherwise is misguided and should be overruled.
Part II of this comment looks at the different treatments utilized
by Louisiana courts in determining when to allow reimbursement
and demonstrates the need for reform. Part III explains why
allowing reimbursement regardless of when the payment was made
presents a more workable solution, one that is fair to all concerned
and in accord with the precepts of the Civil Code. Likewise, Part
III shows that premising the right to reimbursement on the nature
of the property related to the obligation is inappropriate, as it
deviates from the plain language and intent of the code articles and
unnecessarily and unjustly discriminates against the person
discharging the community obligation.
II. THE HISTORY OF LOUISIANA REIMBURSEMENT
Before 1980, under the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 article
2408, reimbursement was a source of confusion among Louisiana
courts because the measure of reimbursement was difficult to
discern.25 For example, Louisiana courts did not know whether to
deduct reimbursement claims, by one spouse against the other,
from the net community assets or from the obligor spouse's share
of the net community. With the addition of the new articles and
subsequent revisions, the confusion dissipated as to calculation of
24. See, e.g., Moody, 622 So. 2d 1381; Davezac, 483 So. 2d 1197.
25. SPAHT & MORENO, supra note 11, § 7.13, at 562 (noting that the
fundamental difference between the old and new articles is the measure of
reimbursement).
26. Katherine Shaw Spaht, Matrimonial Regimes, 50 LA. L. REv. 293 (1989).
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reimbursement, 27 but a new problem arose. Confusion resulted
over when and under what circumstances reimbursement would be
available for the use of separate funds to satisfy community
property obligations. What sort of payments on what sort of
community obligations should be considered reimbursable
expenses?
A. The Evolution of the Right of Reimbursement in Louisiana
Before 1980, there was only one article in the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1870 governing reimbursement, 28 article 2408, which
stated in full:
When the separate property of either the husband or the
wife has been increased or improved during the marriage,
the other spouse, or his or her heirs, shall be entitled to the
reward of one-half of the value of the increase or
ameliorations, if it be proved that the increase or
ameliorations be the result of the common labor, expense or
industry; but there shall be no reward due, if it be proved
that the increase is due only to the ordinary course of
things, to the rise in the value of property, or to the chances
of trade.
In looking at the text, the article did not specify from where the
reimbursement funds should come or who was to pay them.
Additionally, no distinction was made between the use of separate
or community funds for purposes of reimbursement. Revisions
were necessary.
As a part of a comprehensive revision of the Louisiana
matrimonial regimes rules in 1979 and 1980, the redactors
modified Louisiana's reimbursement scheme. In 1980, they added
eleven new articles (2358 through 2368)29 and in 1990, they added
two new articles (2367.1 and 2367.2).3o The rationale behind the
27. SPAHT&MORENO, supra note 11, § 7.14, at 569-74.
28. Spaht & Samuel, supra note 11, at 141.
29. SPAHT&MoREN, supra note 11, § 7.13, at 562.
30. Id. The 1990 revision comment to article 2365 states in full:
[Vol. 68
COMMENTS
addition of these articles was simple-to remedy confusion over
determining the measure of reimbursement. 31  The amount of
reimbursement was clarified to be one-half the amount expended
in satisfying the community obligation.32 Further, after 1990, one
clearly calculates the value of the community assets minus
community debts and then determines each spouse's equal share.
33
The claim for reimbursement must be deducted from each spouse's
share of the net community, rather than from the total net value of
the community assets.
34
In addition to resolving the conflict presented by prior law
about the measure of reimbursement, the new articles, for the first
time, presented a statutory recognition of a right to reimbursement
when separate property was used to satisfy a community obligation
or to improve community property.35  This was accomplished
through the repeal of old article 2408 and the addition of Civil
Code articles 2365 and 2367.36
Under repealed article 2408, there was no statutory right to
reimbursement where separate property was used to satisfy a
community obligation.37 A spouse was assumed to be willing to
Article 2365 has been amended solely for the purpose of clarification of
the law. It has always been implicit in the first paragraph of this article
that the reimbursement was to be made from the other spouse.
Reimbursement from the undivided mass of the community property of
only one-half of the amount due would lead to absurd results.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2365 revision cmt. 1990 (2007).
31. SPAHT& MORENO,supra note 11, § 7.13, at 562.
32. Id. at 562-63.
33. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2358.1 (2007) (as added by 1990 La. Acts No.
991, § 1).
34. Comment (c) to article 2358.1 states:
The principle of accounting is simple and clear. One-half of the
community property that was used to satisfy the separate obligation of a
spouse belonged to that spouse and, therefore, no reimbursement is due
to him. The other half of the community property that was used
belonged to the other spouse, and therefore reimbursement is due him.
35. SPAHT&MORENO, supra note 11, § 7.13, at 563.




give to the community without expecting reimbursement. 38
However, as this unrealistic view of spousal expectations yielded
to the reality of spouses' true, often harsh underlying intentions,
the courts realized a new set of rules was in order. One must
concede that most spouses do not keep a ledger of separate and
community accounts during marriage. This is true because the
issue of reimbursement is relatively insignificant during the
marriage. In fact, this issue is restricted to divorce consideration
because the courts will not allow reimbursement suits during the
marriage.39 When divorce is imminent or pending, spouses are not
likely to consider separate property payments on community
obligations, made during the marriage or post-termination, to be
gifts free from the expectation of repayment. At this time, they
will want a strict accounting of what debts are paid with what
funds and how much they can get back. The new reimbursement
articles sought to bring statutory protection in such situations to
spouses who anticipated reimbursement after expending separate
funds in this manner.4 °
B. The New Law on Reimbursement for Satisfaction of Community
Obligations with Separate Funds
Since the 1980 revision, Civil Code article 2365 expressly
regulates reimbursement for separate funds used to pay a
community debt.41 This article reads, in full:
If separate property of a spouse has been used to satisfy a
community obligation, that spouse, upon termination of the
38. C. Lawrence Orlansky, Termination of the Community, 42 LA. L. REV.
789, 801 (1982).
39. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:291 (2007).
40. Comment (c) to Louisiana Civil Code article 2366 (2007) states:
"Although prior article 2408 did not provide [a statutory right ofl reimbursement
when separate property was used to benefit the community, the jurisprudence
recognized such a right." (citing Emerson v. Emerson, 322 So. 2d 347 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1975)). Now, the spouses expecting reimbursement have greater
protection, because legislation serves as stronger authority than jurisprudence in
Louisiana. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 (2007).
41. SPAHT & MORENO, supra note 11, § 7.14, at 569 (noting that article 2365
permits reimbursement if a community obligation is satisfied with separate
property of a spouse).
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community property regime, is entitled to reimbursement
for one-half of the amount or value that the property had at
the time it was used. The liability of a spouse who owes
reimbursement is limited to the value of his share in the
community after deduction of all community obligations.
Nevertheless, if the community obligation was incurred for
the ordinary and customary expenses of the marriage, or for
the support, maintenance, and education of children of
either spouse in keeping with the economic condition of the
community, the spouse is entitled to reimbursement from
the other spouse regardless of the value of that spouse's
share of the community.
42
The gist of article 2365 is to permit reimbursement when a
communit, obligation is satisfied with a spouse's separate
property.4  If during an accounting of the community property
upon divorce, one discovers that separate property of either spouse
has been used for community purposes, reimbursement may be
claimed.44 The measure of reimbursement is one-half the amount
or value of the property at the time it was used.45 However, a
spouse may only claim reimbursement if there are community
assets from which reimbursement can be made.46
The purpose of this limitation is to protect the other spouse's
separate property from liability for such expenditure for the
indefinite future if the community was insolvent when
terminated.47  However, if the community obligations were
incurred for the ordinary and customary expenses of the marriage,
42. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2365 (2007). The sources for this article are
Louisiana Civil Code article 2408 (1870) and Louisiana Revised Statutes section
9:2852(0 (repealed 1979).
43. Art. 2365 ("If separate property of a spouse has been used to satisfy a
community obligation, that spouse, upon termination of the community property
regime, is entitled to reimbursement for one-half of the amount or value that the
property had at the time it was used. The liability of a spouse who owes
reimbursement is limited to the value of his share in the community after
deduction of all community obligations.").
44. Nina Nichols Pugh, The Evolving Role of Women in the Louisiana Law:
Recent Legislative and Judicial Changes, 42 LA. L. REv. 1571, 1584 (1982).
45. SPAHT & MORENO, supra note 11, § 7.14, at 569.
46. Pugh, supra note 44.
47. SPAHT & MORENO, supra note 11, § 7.14, at 569-70.
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or for the support, maintenance, and education of children, article
2365 allows the spouse making payments to seek reimbursement
even if there are no community assets from which to draw. 48 This
is the only situation where the non-paying spouse's separate
property can be reached for reimbursement because the other
spouse used separate funds to satisfy a community obligation.49
The justification is that the familial nature of the debt validates
more extensive liability.5
0
Article 2365 has proven to be a substantial improvement to the
Louisiana law of reimbursement. First, this article affords greater
protection to spouses expending separate funds to satisfy a
community obligation than did prior law, because it makes
statutory reimbursement for such expenditures available for the
first time.51  This security afforded to spouses is socially and
commercially useful, as it promotes equity among parties who
have joint ownership of property and gives greater assurance to
creditors that debts will be paid because the payor is at lower risk;
a spouse will be more likely to pay the community debt with the
assurance that half of the funds expended will be returned.
Second, article 2365 provides a formula for calculating the
measure of reimbursement. 52  Providing a clear measure of
reimbursement reduces a great deal of confusion surrounding
reimbursement cases and speeds up the judicial process because
issues pertaining to reimbursement calculation can be swiftly and
accurately litigated. Third, the articles make it clear that the burden
of proof is on the party claiming reimbursement to show that
separate funds were used for the benefit of the community. 53
Article 2340 states in full: "Things in the possession of a spouse
48. Art. 2365 ("Nevertheless, if the community obligation was incurred for
the ordinary and customary expenses of the marriage, or for the support,
maintenance, and education of children of either spouse in keeping with the
economic condition of the community, the spouse is entitled to reimbursement
from the other spouse regardless of the value of that spouse's share of the
community.").
49. Spaht, supra note 26, at 296.
50. SPAHT & MORENO, supra note 11, § 7.14, at 570-71.
51. Seeid. § 7.13, at563.
52. See id. § 7.14, at 569-74.
53. Fountain v. Fountain, 644 So. 2d 733, 744 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994) (citing
Patterson v. Patterson, 417 So. 2d 419, 421 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982)).
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during the existence of a regime of community of acquets and
gains are presumed to be community, but either spouse may prove
that they are separate property." 54 This article establishes that, in
disputes, courts will presume that property in possession of
spouses during marriage is community. The spouse claiming that
something is separate property must prove this by a preponderance
of the evidence and thereby rebut the strong presumption of
community. 55  Article 2365 upholds this presumption of
community in reimbursement cases and requires that the party
claiming reimbursement rebut the presumption by proving that
separate funds (rather than community funds) were used to satisfy
the community obligation.
56
C. Continuing Problems with Louisiana's Reimbursement Scheme
As evidenced in the previous sections, both the legislature and
courts have expended much effort to improve Louisiana's scheme
of reimbursement. However, their work is not yet complete.
Another significant problem has developed concerning the
interpretation of article 2365. The focus of the debate has shifted
to questions surrounding the availability of reimbursement on the
whole. Under what circumstances should reimbursement under
article 2365 be allowed?
Much controversy has raged in the Louisiana courts concerning
this issue. Some courts assert a distinction theory whereby the
availability of reimbursement is premised on the type of property
on which the obligation was incurred (hereinafter "distinction
theory"). 57 This theory originated in the fifth circuit in Gachez v.
Gachez, where the court distinguished between allowing
reimbursement for mortgage payments on the home and forbidding
54. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2340 (2007).
55. See generally Talbot v. Talbot, 864 So. 2d 590 (La. 2003) (holding that a
spouse can rebut the presumption that property in possession of a spouse during
the marriage is community property by a preponderance of evidence establishing
the separate nature of the property).
56. Fountain, 644 So. 2d at 744.
57. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 21.
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58
reimbursement for the payment of car notes. This case and those
following its line of reasoning look at the use of the property and
its valuation through rates of appreciation or depreciation.
9
Other courts assert that the availability of reimbursement must
hinge upon when the community obligation was satisfied with
separate property.60 This issue has also proved contentious and has
resulted in two distinct points of view. The first urges that
payment made after the termination of the community property
regime should not be reimbursed.6' One of the first cases to
distinctly employ this reasoning was Bergeron v. Bergeron.62
However, the alternative point of view asserts that, as long as the
payment was made before the community property was
partitioned, the expense must be reimbursed.63  One of the
trailblazer cases to establish this interpretation was Davezac v.
Davezac.64  Unfortunately, no consistent conclusion has been
reached and no single theory uniformly expounded among the
circuit courts. The debate will continue to rage until the Louisiana
Supreme Court steps in and resolves this issue.
III. WHAT IS THE BEST SOLUTION?
There are two theories propounded to address when a spouse
may obtain reimbursement for separate funds used to pay a
community debt. The first theory states that the court must
distinguish between types of property upon which the community
debt is owed.65 Proponents of the distinction theory believe that
reimbursement should be considered in light of whether the
58. Kenneth Rigby, Matrimonial Regimes: Recent Developments, 59 LA. L.
REV. 465, 501 (citing Gachez v. Gachez, 451 So. 2d 608 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984)).
59. See generally, e.g., Gachez, 451 So. 2d 608.
60. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 22.
61. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 23.
62. 693 So. 2d 199, 202 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1997).
63. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 24.
64. 483 So. 2d 1197, 1199 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986). Although the court
distinguished between movables and immovables, it still allowed reimbursement
for a payment made post-termination of the marriage but pre-partition of property.
Id.
65. See sources cited supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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community debt involved a movable or an immovable. 66 There
should be no reimbursement for debts paid on movables, they
argue, because use is directly related to depreciation; therefore,
exclusive use on a movable presents a bar to reimbursement.
67
The second theory states that the court should premise the right
to reimbursement on when the payment was made.68 This theory
gets at the question of when a payment is made too late to be
reimbursed. Some courts assert that if the payment was made after
termination of the community property regime, then there can be
no recovery. 69 This view restricts the application of article 2365 to
payments made on a community obligation during the existence of
the marriage. 70  However, other courts have rejected this
construction of article 2365 and found that as long as the payment
was made before the partition of community property, then
reimbursement for a post-termination payment can still be
obtained.7'
This section will (1) demonstrate the weaknesses of the first
theory, which sorts reimbursement claims by property type and (2)
display the strengths of the second theory, which seeks to allocate
reimbursement regardless of the timing of payment, by showing
that payments made post-termination of community but pre-
partition of property are acceptable as reimbursement claims.
A. The Distinction Theory
The second, 72 third,73 fourth, 74 and fifth75 circuits support the
distinction theory.76 In contrast, the first circuit utilizes the
alternative theory, based on the timing of the payment.
77
66. See id.
67. Gachez v. Gachez, 451 So. 2d 608, 613 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984).
68. See generally Sheridon v. Sheridon, 867 So. 2d 38 (La. App. 3d Cir.
2004); Moody v. Moody, 622 So. 2d 1381 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993).
69. Sheridon, 867 So. 2d at 44.
70. Id.
71. Moody, 622 So. 2d at 1385.
72. Mason v. Mason, 927 So. 2d 1235, 1240 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2006).
73. Sheridon, 867 So. 2d at 45.
74. Davezac v. Davezac, 483 So. 2d 1197, 1199 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986);
Meyer v. Meyer, 553 So. 2d 943, 944 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
75. Gachez v. Gachez, 451 So. 2d 608,612-14 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984).
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In the second circuit's decision in Mason v. Mason, for
instance, Stanley and Rowena Mason obtained a judgment of
divorce and then later sought to partition their property. When
the trial court entered a judgment partitioning the property, it also
assigned community liabilities. 79  Rowena was allocated the
mortgage on the house and the loan on the family car.80 Stanley
appealed the judgment because the trial court awarded Rowena
reimbursement for one-half of the amount she paid after
termination of the marriage and before the community property
partition on the home mortgage and the car loan.
8 1
Similarly, in Sheridon v. Sheridon, Mrs. Sheridon sought
reimbursement for payments she made, post-termination of the
marriage but pre-partition of the community property, on the home
mortgage and payments on a vehicle of which she had use and
82 83possession. The trial court awarded her reimbursement. Mr.
Sheridon appealed this judgment to the third circuit. 84 In the fourth
circuit's Davezac v. Davezac, Mr. Davezac sought reimbursement
for payments he made out of his separate property on the note
given for the purchase of the family vehicle. 5 He had possession
and use of the automobile at all times; however, he claimed the
principles applied to reimbursement for home mortgages should be
likewise applied to his situation with his vehicle. He appealed
the trial court's denial for reimbursement for his separate property
76. The four definitive cases supporting this theory in these circuits are
Mason, 927 So. 2d 1235, Sheridon, 867 So. 2d 38, Davezac, 483 So. 2d 1197, and
Gachez, 451 So. 2d 608.
77. Moody v. Moody, 622 So. 2d 1381 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993) (supporting
allocation of reimbursement payments based on the timing of payment rather than
the property related to the obligation).




82. 867 So. 2d 38, 41-42 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2004).
83. Id.
84. Id.




payments on the car note8 7 and sought reimbursement from the
community for those payments.
8 8
Lastly, the facts in the fifth circuit's Gachez v. Gachez case are
similar but deal solely with immovable property.89 The trial court
awarded the husband one-half of each of eleven mortgage
payments he made on the community home after the date of the
filing of the petition for divorce. 90  The husband appealed this
judgment, claiming he should have received full reimbursement
rather than half.91
The facts of each of these cases are similar and, in each, the
court found that the availability of reimbursement hinged on the
type of property upon which the debts were owed. However, close
examination of these facts and the need for application of
principles of equity to both spouses demonstrates that the
reasoning behind the distinction theory is flawed and should not be
used because of the inequitable results it perpetuates.
The distinction theory propounded by these four Louisiana
circuits requires that courts draw a distinction between an
obligation related to movables and one related to immovables.
92
The theory is purportedly supported by the reality of appreciation
and depreciation.93  The classic item of property illustrating
movable depreciation is a vehicle. Under the distinction theory, a
spouse who has exclusive use of an automobile following the
termination of the community is not entitled to credit for notes paid
on the vehicle.94  Automobiles and other movables tend to
depreciate over time, and the use of the vehicle is directly related
to its depreciation. 95  Proponents of the theory believe equity
dictates that a spouse should not have full use, benefit, and
enjoyment of the movable at the expense of the other spouse.96
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1198.
89. 451 So. 2d 608 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984).
90. Id. at 610.
91. Id. at611.
92. See sources cited supra note 21.
93. See generally Gachez, 451 So. 2d 608.
94. Mason v. Mason, 927 So. 2d 1235, 1240 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2006).
95. Gachez, 451 So. 2d at 613.
96. Id. at 614.
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The car note payments by the spouse using the vehicle are
considered a payment for the depreciation caused by his use of it.
97
Thus, Mrs. Mason, Mrs. Sheridon, and Mr. Davezac were denied
reimbursement for payments made out of separate property on a
community car loan.98 This interpretation of article 2365, though
attractive, suffers from a number of fatal flaws.
1. Plain Meaning Does Not Support the Distinction
As evidenced by the text of the Civil Code itself, one of the
foundational tenets of civilian legislative interpretation is the plain
meaning approach. When the language of an article is
unambiguous and does not lead to an absurd result, the court
should not use any additional interpretative methods. 99 Certainly,
different meanings can be given an article depending on who is
interpreting it, but the intent of the drafters of the articles in the
Civil Code was for the words and phrases to be given the meaning
that best conforms to the pur0pose of the law as well as their
generally prevailing meaning.
Therefore, in determining whether courts should distinguish
between movables and immovables for the purposes of
reimbursement, we should begin by looking at the plain language
of article 2365. Article 2365 states: "If separate property of a
spouse has been used to satisfy a community obligation, that
spouse, upon termination of the community property regime, is
entitled to reimbursement for one-half of the amount or value that
the property had at the time it was used."'' ° There is nothing in the
language of article 2365 suggesting a distinction between
obligations owed on movables and those owed on immovables for
the purpose of reimbursement. The article does not say "a
97. Mason, 927 So. 2d at 1240.
98. See generally Mason, 927 So. 2d 1235; Sheridon v. Sheridon, 867 So. 2d
38, 44 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2004); Davezac v. Davezac, 483 So. 2d 1197, 1199 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1986).
99. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9 (2007).
100. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 10, 11 (2007).
101. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2365 (2007).
102. Williams v. Williams, 509 So. 2d 77, 80 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987),
superseded by statute, 1990 La. Acts No. 2502, 2522 (codified as LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:374 (2007)).
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community obligation [owed on an immovable]," and it certainly
does not exclude community obligations owed on movables.
Civil Code article 9 states: "When a law is clear and
unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd
consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further
interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the
legislature."' 10 3 In Louisiana, legislation is superior to any other
source of law. 10 4 The court must apply legislative provisions as
written because the court cannot and should not ignore the plain
expression of legislative will evidenced in the unambiguous words
of the code articles. 10 5  The courts cannot create, through a
"judicial gloss," a new test or policy to supersede clear code
articles even when the plain meaning interpretation leads to an
objectionable result.10 6 The plain, clear language of article 2365
draws no distinction between obligations on movables and
immovables, and, according to Louisiana Revised Statutes section
24:177, "the text of the law is the best evidence of legislative
intent." Therefore, a theory that allocates reimbursement based on
the type of property constituting the community obligation fails to
comport with the well-accepted principles of legislative
interpretation. Such a theory cannot stand.
The comments to article 2365 further reiterate that "when the
separate property of a spouse is used to satisfy any community
obligation, the spouse is entitled upon termination of the
community property regime to reimbursement for one-half of the
103. Art. 9.
104. Comment (c) to Louisiana Civil Code article 1 (2007) reads as follows:
In Louisiana, as in other civil law jurisdictions, legislation is superior to
any other source of law. Article I of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870
(Article 2 of this projet), declaring that legislation is a formal expression
of legislative will, has been interpreted to establish the supremacy of
legislation and to exclude judicial legislation. It is only in cases not
covered by legislation that a lawyer or judge may look for solutions
elsewhere.
See also A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, LOuIsIANA CIVIL LAW SYSTEM COURSEBOOK 45-
47 (1977) (discussing legislation as a source of law in Louisiana).
105. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr. v. Caddo Shreveport Sales & Use Tax, 903 So.
2d 1071, 1092 (La. 2005), superseded by revision of the Civil Code, 2005 La. Acts
No. 301.
106. Id. at 1085.
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amount or the value that the property had at the time it was
used."' 0 7  Though not a formal source of law, 10 8 the doctrine
contained in comments is still persuasive authority in Louisiana.
0 9
Without completely binding the interpreter, the comments
admonish him to use prudence before he disregards them."0 This
doctrine indicates that no movable-immovable distinction should
be drawn. The language provides that any community obligation
can be reimbursed if satisfied with separate property-expressly
rejecting a distinction between obligations related to movables and
those related to immovables. Therefore, the implication of this
relevant doctrine is that the conclusion of the Louisiana circuit
courts supporting a distinction theory is erroneous.
2. Exclusive Use Based on Depreciation Does Not Withstand
Scrutiny
The courts asserting the distinction theory, in the matrimonial
regimes context, claim that the main reason for making the
distinction is that use is directly related to depreciation in
movables." ll Proponents of this theory suggest that by retaining
exclusive use while making payments, one is thereby
compensating 2for the decrease in value being caused by the
constant use. 1 For example, in Mason, the second circuit held
that the payments on depreciable movables like vehicles were not
reimbursable and, thus, reversed the judgment that gave Rowena
reimbursement on half of her separate funds expended on the
107. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2365 cmt. a (2007).
108. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 (2007).
109. Comment (b) to article 1 states, "According to civilian doctrine,
legislation and custom are authoritative or primary sources of law. They are
contrasted with persuasive or secondary sources of law, such as jurisprudence,
doctrine, conventional usages, and equity, that may guide the court in reaching a
decision in the absence of legislation and custom." See also YIANNOPOuLos,
supra note 104, at 45-47 (discussing sources of law in Louisiana, focusing
particularly on legislation).
110. FRANcois GENY, METHODE D'INTERPRETATION ET SOURCES EN DROrr
PRIVE PosTiF no. 150, at 340 (La. State Law Inst., trans., 2d ed. 1963) (1954)).





vehicle.113 Likewise, in Davezac, the court affirmed the judgment
of the trial court and found that the husband was to be charged for
the full cost of maintaining the vehicle of which he had exclusive
use while it steadily declined in value.' 4
Though the above reasoning seems solid, these courts and other
proponents of the distinction theory fail to realize that there is
sometimes depreciation in immovables as well, particularly when a
piece of property is used and kept off the market. One example of
depreciating immovables occurs in the housing market after a
natural disaster. In the wake of the crisis, property values in areas
away from the distressed region soar because of the massive influx
of people desperately needing housing. After the need dies down,
the property values will, in most cases, return to normal and
property owners will own homes valued at substantially less than
what they paid. In situations like these, when an immovable
depreciates in value, exclusively using and keeping a piece of
property off of the rapidly decreasing market will further the
reduction in value.
Therefore, there is logic behind treating movables and
immovables in the same manner and requiring a reduction in
reimbursement for both. Though circumstances like these seem
rare, they occur more frequently than one might think, especially in
hurricane-prone states like Louisiana. The courts must not slight
the people in community property jurisdictions like Louisiana who
face these situations. To anticipate such scenarios, a uniform
standard should be established as to movables and immovables
with both given reductions in value based on use. Should the
courts wish to avoid these complications altogether, they can easily
do so by eradicating the distinction theory.
Applying these ideas to the cases supporting the distinction
theory would have changed their results in important ways. Either
reimbursement would have been reduced for the houses belonging
to Mr. Gachez, Mr. Davezac, and Mr. Mason as well as the cases
involving vehicles, or the court would have, instead, just allowed
full reimbursement for the vehicles belonging to Mrs. Sheridon,
113. Mason v. Mason, 927 So. 2d 1235, 1241 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2006).
114. Davezac v. Davezac, 483 So. 2d 1197, 1199 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
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Mrs. Mason, and Mr. Davezac. Whatever avenue is chosen, the
distinction that is currently drawn cannot be perpetuated.
3. More Problems with Exclusive Use-No Use and Joint Use
Another problem exists with maintaining that the basis of the
distinction theory is exclusive use offsetting depreciation. What
about payments on a movable that no one used or that both spouses
used?
A telling example of such a situation occurred in the
previously-mentioned case of Sheridon v. Sheridon."5 Mr. and
Mrs. Sheridon filed for divorce and partition of the community
property on October 5, 1999 and were divorced by judicial decree
on August 31, 2000.116 Because the date of termination of the
community in Louisiana is typically retroactive to the date of filing
of the divorce petition, 117 the Sheridons' community ended
effective October 5, 1999. The partition of the Sheridons'
community property, however, was not effected until August 16,
2002.118 An automobile purchased during the existence of the
community remained parked outside the family home from
October 5, 1999, to September 9, 2000.119 During that time, Mr.
Sheridon paid the insurance premiums on the vehicle and later
claimed reimbursement for his separate funds expended on the
community obligation. 120 The trial court rejected his claim for
reimbursement, stating that Mrs. Sheridon did not refuse to allow
him to use the truck and did not use it herself.12' Therefore, Mr.
Sheridon did not receive reimbursement for payments on a
community obligation even though he did not have possession and
exclusive use of the truck.
122
This result is contrary to the typically avowed purpose of
refusing to allow reimbursement for obligations related to
115. 867 So. 2d 38 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2004).
116. Id. at41.
117. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 159 (2007).







movables. Louisiana courts have refused reimbursement for
obligations on movables based on the reasoning that the exclusive
use and possession of one spouse directly contributes to the
depreciation of the property. 123 In Sheridon, there was no use or
possession by the spouse who paid the note; therefore, there was
no depreciation in value other than that caused by time as the
vehicle aged. The third circuit should have allowed reimbursement
in this case. However, because of the principal, albeit flawed,
rationale supporting the distinction theory-namely, exclusive use
causing depreciation-an erroneous judicial conclusion inevitably
resulted. This is yet another reason the distinction theory must be
abolished.
4. The Distinction Theory---An Inequity and Public Policy
Nightmare
In examining whether courts should apply the distinction
theory, one must look to equity and public policy. A debt is a legal
obligation no matter the type of property upon which it is owed,
and a party should be reimbursed if he pays a debt for which he is
not solely accountable. For automobile and mortgage obligations
incurred by either spouse during the existence of the community
property regime, both spouses are obligated to pay the
indebtedness in full.' 24 This is evidenced by the fact that creditors
can seize the separate property of the incurring spouse and the
entirety of the community property (or former community
property) of the spouses to satisfy the debt.' 2 5 Herein lies the true
123. See, e.g., Gachez v. Gachez, 451 So. 2d 608, 613 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1984).
124. Sheridon, 867 So. 2d at 50 (Woodard, J., dissenting).
125. The Louisiana rules of seizure for creditors pertaining to spousal
obligations are contained in Louisiana Civil Code articles 2345 and 2357 (2007).
According to these rules, a separate or community obligation may be satisfied
during the community property regime from community property and from the
separate property of the spouse who incurred the obligation. Art. 2345.
Additionally, an obligation incurred by a spouse before or during the community
property regime may be satisfied after termination of the regime from the property
of the former community and from the separate property of the spouse who
incurred the obligation. Art. 2357. These rules of seizure are different from other
community property jurisdictions. Idaho, Nevada, and Texas adhere to a
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inequity of the distinction theory. Failure to pay the debt would
result in severe credit and foreclosure problems for both
spouses. 126  If payments were disregarded, not only would the
creditor be able to seize the separate property of the incurring
spouse, but also the entirety of the community property that had
not yet been partitioned.127 To avoid this result, Mr..Davezac, Mrs.
Sheridon, and Mrs. Mason paid the car notes and benefited both
their former spouses and themselves because the former
community property could not be seized as long as the debt was
paid.
Therefore, because of the necessity of timely payment on both
movables and immovables, there should be no distinction drawn
managerial system category--only property that the incurring spouse had the right
to manage can be seized by creditors (the purpose for which the debt was incurred
is irrelevant). Andrea B. Carroll, The Superior Position of the Creditor in the
Community Property Regime: Has the Community Become a Mere Creditor
Collection Device?, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 14 (2007). Although Louisiana and
California are often described as managerial systems, a strict managerial system
would only allow a creditor to seize the property managed by the debtor spouse.
Id. at 13. Rather, Louisiana and California broaden creditors' access to seize all
community property, the portion of the community property managed jointly, and
the property managed exclusively by the non-incurring spouse. Id. Therefore,
management of community property has no bearing on creditor's rights, so the
managerial label simply does not fit these states. Id. Arizona, New Mexico,
Washington, and Wisconsin, on the other hand, have rejected the managerial
system and chosen the community debt system. Id. at 17. Under this scheme, the
community is characterized as a combination of property for the interest and
benefit of the spouses; therefore, property in the community is only seizable for a
debt incurred (by either spouse) for the benefit or in the interest of the community.
Id. The debt is then classified as a community debt and the entirety of the
community property may be seized by creditors. Id. Wisconsin, however, limits
tort liability to the property of the debtor that is not marital property or that
spouse's interest in marital property. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.55(2)(c)(2)(cm)
(1985). In contractual liability, Wisconsin follows the other community debt
states in allowing the seizure of the entirety of the community property. Id. at §
766.55(2)(b). The Louisiana rule is inherently unfair because it allows creditors to
have access to property managed by the spouse who had nothing to do with the
incurring of the debt. The pure managerial system and community debt system
provide more equitable results to spouses in that they better protect the property of
the non-incurring spouse.
126. See generally Carroll, supra note 125.
127. See id. at 13.
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for the purpose of reimbursement. The payor is acting in his or her
own interest and the interest of the other spouse by satisfying the
community debt. As such, he or she should be reimbursed for half
the amount expended, regardless of the type of property on which
the underlying obligation is owed. This scenario can be analogized
to one in which a stranger pays an obligation for which he and
another are both responsible. When this occurs, the payor may
demand reimbursement for half of his payment from the other
obligor. 28  Why should the courts treat divorced spouses
differently than strangers in the same circumstances?
In sum, the courts should not apply the distinction theory. It
perpetuates interpretive error, as evidenced by the lack of
distinction language in article 2365. Further, the theory is simply
impracticable in that its only support rests on exclusive use (or lack
thereof) as related to depreciation. Finally, public policy and the
demands of equity dictate its abolition because of the unfair results
it creates.
5. The Effect of Jurisprudence Constante
Regardless of how Louisiana courts should interpret article
2365, are they now required to apply the "distinction based on
property type" theory as a result of the precedent set forth by the
second, third, fourth, and fifth circuits? 129 Louisiana, as a mixed
jurisdiction, 130 retains many civil law principles, including
avoidance of the common law doctrine of stare decisis.
1
Louisiana, instead, abides by the civilian principle of jurisprudence
constante. 132 The traditional civilian theory of jurisprudence is that
it is not a source of law.' 33 Judgments have judicial force only
between the persons who were parties to the proceedings and are
128. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1794,1804 (2007).
129. See sources cited supra note 21 and accompanying text.
130. A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM: LOUISIANA AND
COMPARATIVE LAW 92 (1999).
131. Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119, 128-29 (La. 2000).
132. James L. Dennis, Interpretation and Application of the Civil Code and the
Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 LA. L. REV. 1, 15 (1993).
133. KENNETH M. MURCHISON & J.-R. TRAHAN, WESTERN LEGAL TRADITIONS
AND SYSTEMS: LEGAL IMPACT 100 (1999) (citing JEAN CARBONNIER, DROIT
CIVIL: INTRODUCTION no. 144, at 256-58 (J.-R. Trahan trans., 2001) (1999)).
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not opposable to third parties as legislation would be; also,
jurisprudence lacks the popular origin and duration required to
make it customary law. 134 Therefore, jurisprudence does not fall
under the two true sources of Louisiana law-legislation and
custom. 135  Jurisprudence is thus an authority in civil law
jurisdictions only in the sense that it influences decisions more or
less forcefully while never imposing a decision as a matter of law.
Nonetheless, jurisprudence is a "privileged" authority, as it has a
greater chance of being accepted by the court before which
litigation is pending than other merely persuasive sources.' 136 Still,
"one of the fundamental rules of [the civil law tradition] is that a
tribunal is never bound by the decisions which it formerly
rendered: it can always change its mind.'
137
One may concede that, even under the Louisiana doctrine of
jurisprudence constante, in the case of a long line of consistent
judicial decisions, courts are not bound to, but often do adhere to,
prior principles. 138 However, there is no long line of consistent
decisions in Louisiana courts relating to the proper interpretation
of Louisiana Civil Code article 2365. For example, the second
circuit initially refused to draw a distinction based on type of
property when it considered the question in the 1997 case of
Chance v. Chance.139  Only recently, in 2006, did the second
circuit overturn Chance with the Mason v. Mason decision
supporting distinction. 140 Thus, the second circuit has not had a
long line of cases pointing toward the distinction theory. The
development has only come about since 2006.
Likewise, the third circuit has not been firm in its stance on the
distinction issue. In 2001, the court, in Nash v. Nash, asserted that
reimbursement should be allowed even though the paying spouse
134. Id. at 100-01.
135. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 (2007).
136. MURCHISON& TRAHAN, supra note 133, at 101.
137. 1 MARCEL PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW 83 (La. State Law Inst.
trans., 1959) (12th ed. 1939).
138. MURCHISON & TRAHAN, supra note 133, at 104 (citing BORIS STARCK,
DROrr CIvIL: INTRODUCTION 51-53 (J.-R. Trahan trans., 1997) (1972)).
139. 694So.2d613,616(La.App.2dCir. 1997).
140. 927 So. 2d 1235, 1241 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2006).
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had exclusive use of the movable. 14 1 In Nash, the third circuit
went against its own prior decisions in Preis and Bergeron, which
had supported the distinction theory. 142  However, the Nash
decision was recently overturned by Sheridon in 2004.14 1 Clearly,
then, the third circuit has taken no consistent position on the issue.
Ultimately, "no jurisprudential decision imposes itself on any
court whatsoever' 144 in a mixed jurisdiction like Louisiana. This
position is bolstered by looking at the inconsistency regarding
reimbursement's connection to property type in the Louisiana
circuits. There is no clear line of authority pointing toward a
specific conclusion. Therefore, according to the principles of
jurisprudence constante, no court is required, or even
recommended, to follow the current, flawed majority view.
Despite this standard, the Louisiana Supreme Court must still
intervene to provide persuasive guidance from a higher authority
and firmly correct the legal errors being perpetuated through the
lower courts.
If the courts accept and apply reimbursement based on the type
of property related to the obligation, much damage will be wrought
in Louisiana's law of matrimonial regimes. Errors resting on non-
existent Code language will be perpetuated through the courts.
Additionally, the spouse who pays an obligation on former
community property to prevent serious and substantial effects of
non-payment will suffer inequity. In view of these and other
adverse effects, the distinction theory should be rejected.
B. The Timing Theory
In concluding that distinguishing between movables and
immovables for purposes of reimbursement is erroneous, we must
return to the original question: When is reimbursement available?
141. 799 So. 2d 829, 830 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2001).
142. Preis v. Preis, 649 So. 2d 593, 596 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994); Bergeron v.
Bergeron, 693 So. 2d 199, 202 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1997).
143. Sheridon v. Sheridon, 867 So. 2d 38, 45 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2004).
144. MURCHISON & TRAHAN, supra note 133, at 102 (citing MICHEL FROMONT
& ALFRED REIG, INTRODUCTION AU DROIT ALLEMAND: FOUNDATIONS 201-02 (J.-
R. Trahan, trans., 2001) (1977)).
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Some Louisiana courts (specifically the third circuit) have held
that reimbursement can be made only when separate funds were
expended during the existence of the community.145 In Sheridon,
the court found that Ms. Sheridon would be entitled, under article
2365, to reimbursement for community debts she paid with
separate funds before termination of the marriage. 46 Therefore,
the third circuit found that because the parties had terminated the
marriage on October 5, 1999,147 the trial court erred in ordering
Mr. Sheridon to reimburse Ms. Sheridon one-half of the amount
she paid on the Pontiac Firebird between October 5, 1999 and
November 15, 2001.148 Subsequently, the third circuit applied the
Sheridon reasoning to the Bordelon case. Mr. Bordelon made
mortgage payments in February 2002, after the community ended
in 2001.149 The payments were made on a stipulated community
debt with Mr. Bordelon's separate property. 150 The court applied
the same reasoning as used in Sheridon and found that the
payments made on the mortgage, after termination of the marriage,
were not reimbursable.151
Other courts, instead, assert that any legitimate claim for
reimbursement can be sustained, even post-termination of the
community, as long as payment was made before the partition of
the community property. 152 The first circuit so held in Moody v.
Moody: Mr. Moody paid the mortgage on the community home
after the termination of the community but before the partition of
property and sought reimbursement of these payments.' 53  The
court found that under article 2365, Mr. Moody was entitled to be
reimbursed for one-half the separate funds used to extinguish the
community obligation. 154
145. Sheridon, 867 So. 2d at 45; Bordelon v. Bordelon, 942 So. 2d 708 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 2006).
146. Sheridon, 867 So. 2d at 44.
147. Id at41.
148. Id. at 44.
149. Bordelon, 942 So. 2d at 714.
150. Id
151. Id. at 714-15.
152. See generally, e.g., Moody v. Moody, 622 So. 2d 1381 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1993).




The remainder of the Louisiana circuit courts have not directly
ruled on this issue. Which of these interpretations, if either, should
the Louisiana courts consistently follow?
1. Is There Any "Plain Meaning" on This Point?
The language of Civil Code article 2365 states that "[i]f
separate property of a spouse has been used to satisfy a community
obligation, that spouse, upon termination of the community
property regime, is entitled to reimbursement for one-half of the
amount or value that the property had at the time it was used."
Supporters of the theory that article 2365 allows reimbursement
only for separate funds expended before the termination of the
community assert that the phrase "upon termination of the
community property regime" in article 2365 means that one can
only receive reimbursement for satisfaction of a community
obligation with separate funds when the payment was made during
the existence of the community property regime. 55 They maintain
that the article does not state "upon partition" but specifically
states "upon termination," so the codal reimbursement scheme
pertains solely to those debts paid during the marriage and not
those paid after the termination of the community. 156 Under such
an interpretation of article 2365, no post-termination payments
may be reimbursed.
Is such a timing restriction justified? An alternative
interpretation of article 2365 is that the phrase "upon termination"
merely means that spouses must wait until the marriage is
terminated to sue for reimbursement. 57 Therefore, payments made
post-termination of the community but pre-partition of property are
allowed because there is no requirement that payment be made
during the marriage.
Unfortunately, the two logical, yet fundamentally contradictory
interpretations of the phrase "upon termination of the community
property regime" demonstrate that the plain language of article
2365 is ambiguous on this particular point. The text of the article
155. See, e.g., Sheridon, 867 So. 2d at44.
156. Id
157. See, e.g., id. at 51 (Woodard, J., dissenting).
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gives no real indication of what the phrase is meant to describe.
Does it mean that one can only be reimbursed for payments made
during the existence of the community property regime? Or, does
it merely mean that spouses cannot sue each other during the
existence of the community for reimbursement? The inherent
ambiguity in the language of article 2365 necessitates the use of
other methods of interpretation to determine the actual meaning of
the phrase "upon termination of the community property regime."
Moreover, even if one accepts the dubious proposition that the
plain language of article 2365 is clear and only allows
reimbursement for separate funds expended to satisfy a community
obligation during the marriage, one might conclude that such a
reading would lead to an absurd result and should, therefore, be
rejected. 158  After the termination of the community, property
awaits judicial partition and is still owned by both spouses, though
it may be in the possession of just one.159 Because the spouses are
each accountable for community obligations, 160 and creditors can
seize the separate property of the incurring spouse and the entirety
of the community property to pay these debts,' 6 1 the husband and
wife must both be responsible for the debts incurred by the
community up until the point that the property is partitioned and
ownership is divided. 162  Even after partition, courts allocate
liability only as between the spouses. 163  Third parties remain
unaffected and can always seize former community property in the
hands of either spouse. 164 Not allowing co-owners of property
(who are fully liable to third parties for debts) to seek
reimbursement from one another when one satisfies that debt, only
because the marriage no longer exists, is absurd. As long as the
community property has not been partitioned, half of all payments
made on community debts with the separate property of one spouse
158. LA. CIV. CODEANN. art. 2358 (2007).
159. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2369.2 (2007).
160. Sheridon, 867 So. 2d at 51 (Woodard, J., dissenting).
161. See generally LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2357, 2345 (2007).
162. This debt collection rule is not limited to community property obligations
as it also applies to separate property obligations. Art. 2357.




should be reimbursed by the other spouse because the payments
benefit both.
The effects of the interpretation rejecting reimbursement
claims for post-termination payments are as detrimental as those
associated with the distinction theory. Once again, equity demands
that a spouse who pays a community obligation to prevent ill-
effects of default, even after the termination of the community but
before partition, be reimbursed for half the payment. A spouse
must not be forced to bear the costs of the obligation just because
he was generous or unwise enough to pay the debt at the incorrect
time. By refusing to reimburse post-termination payments, a
spouse pays off an obligation to a third party but then cannot
acquire relief from his former spouse. The absurd, inequitable
result produced by this interpretation necessitates that another
theory be asserted that better protects the spouses' rights and
places them on a more level playing field.
2. Reading Article 2365 in Pari Materia with Other
Matrimonial Regime Articles
Reimbursement should be allowed for post-termination
payments made on a community debt with separate funds as long
as those payments were made before the community property was
partitioned. An argument in pari materia demonstrates the
reasonableness of such an approach. An argument in pari materia
appeals to context and suggests that legislation should be
interpreted in light of similar and surrounding articles. 165 Civil
Code article 2358, also in the section dealing with the spouses'
rights of reimbursement, states: "Upon termination of a community
property regime, a spouse may have a claim against the other
spouse for reimbursement in accordance with the following
provisions. ' 66 The phrase "upon termination of the community
property regime" in article 2358 is clearly meant to explain when
suit for reimbursement can be brought. The phrase aims to prevent
spouses from suing each other for reimbursement while married.
16 7
165. MURCHISON & TRAHAN, supra note 133, at 172-73.
166. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2358 (2007).




This assertion is furthered by Louisiana Revised Statutes section
9:291, which states:
Spouses may not sue each other except for causes of action
pertaining to contracts or arising out of the provisions of
Book III, Title VI of the Civil Code; for restitution of
separate property; for divorce or declaration of nullity of
the marriage; and for causes of action pertaining to spousal
support or the support or custody of a child while the
spouses are living separate and apart.
This interspousal immunity exists to maintain domestic
tranquility and promote the stability of the family unit.'
68
Ultimately, the phrase is not meant to say that only payments made
during the existence of the community property regime are valid
for reimbursement consideration. Quite the contrary, the phrase
merely states that suit can only be brought "upon termination of
the community property regime."
Therefore, in reading article 2365 in light of article 2358, one
must conclude that the phrase "upon termination of the community
property regime" in article 2365 means that spouses cannot sue for
reimbursement during the marriage. Payments made post-
termination can be claimed for reimbursement as long as they were
made before the partitioning of property, after which the former
community property would become individually owned.
3. Public Policy and Principles of Equity Support Post-
Termination/Pre-Partition Reimbursement
Public policy along with equity and fairness support this
interpretation of the timing theory. In Louisiana, when no rule for
a particular situation can be derived from legislation or custom, the
court is bound to proceed according to equity; to decide equitably,
resort is made to justice, reason, and prevailing usages. 169 Both
law and equity dictate that if one pays a debt for which he is not
solely accountable, he must be compensated. 170  As previously
mentioned, until community property is partitioned, both spouses
168. Smith v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 174 So. 2d 122, 124 (La. 1965).
169. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 4 (2007).
170. Sheridon, 867 So. 2d at 51 (Woodard, J., dissenting).
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retain ownership and are responsible, to the extent of the former
community property, for the community obligations incurred
during marriage.' 71 Someone must pay this debt or a creditor may
seize the separate property of the incurring spouse and the entirety
of the spouses' community property to satisfy it. If one party
utilizes his separate property to pay a debt, the incurrence of which
subjects the spouses' community property to seizure, law and
equity demand that he be reimbursed for half.1
7 2
A person who has been enriched without cause at the expense
of another person is bound to compensate that person. 173 Such is
the case here because one spouse is unjustly enriched when he or
she is relieved from paying an obligation owed by both spouses.
However, principles of unjust enrichment are not used when the
law provides an alternative remedy for the impoverishment.
174
Therefore, instead of using the doctrine of enrichment without
cause between spouses, courts employ article 2365, which provides
the alternative remedy of reimbursement for situations involving
satisfaction of community obligations with separate property.
Clearly, a former spouse must not be denied reimbursement
when he expends his separate property to satisfy a community
obligation after the marriage was terminated but before ownership
was partitioned. As long as the property has not been partitioned,
ownership is still shared, 175 and the obligation subjects the former
community property of both spouses to seizure.' 76  Therefore,
reimbursement must be accorded to the spouse who generously
pays the community debt with separate funds in order to prevent
creditors from seizing his former community property.
The inequities inherent in refusing reimbursement for post-
termination, pre-partition payments are well illustrated in the
context of home mortgages. For example, assume a husband and
wife own a home acquired during the community. After they
divorce, the wife retains the home and pays the monthly mortgage
171. Id. This debt collection rule applies to separate property obligations as
well as community property obligations. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2357 (2007).
172. Sheridon, 867 So. 2d at 51 (Woodard, J., dissenting).
173. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2298 (2007).
174. Id.
175. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2369.2 (2007).
176. Art. 2357.
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payments with her separate funds. The husband is also
accountable for the mortgage, and the former community in either
the wife's or the husband's hands could be seized to satisfy the
debt. However, the wife continues the payments on the debt,
thereby bringing a benefit to her former husband. Under an
interpretation that only allows reimbursement for payments made
during the existence of the community, the wife would not receive
reimbursement for any portion of the payments made after the
divorce.
Under this flawed interpretation of article 2365, the husband
will have an unfair advantage and may potentially prolong the
settlement as the wife continues making payments that the husband
is not required to reimburse. This theory could result in three
problems.
First, the husband would have no financial incentive to bring
the proceedings to a conclusion because he is not liable for
reimbursement payments. The case would be prolonged in the
courts, hindering judicial efficiency. Often, getting a partition of
property after rendering a judgment of divorce takes years. If
reimbursement is not available during this period, thousands of
dollars will be lost by the spouse who is paying the community
debt with his separate property. By declaring that the non-paying
spouse will owe no reimbursement to the other, no financial
incentive is created to speed up the judicial process. Therefore,
reimbursement must be required so as not to create a bar to judicial
efficiency.
Second, the wife may have an unfair disadvantage. If she is
financially unable to continue making payments, she will be forced
to settle to her disadvantage to get out from under the massive
financial obligation. This unfair disadvantage is tied to the lack of
financial incentive to reach a settlement. If the husband does not
have a financial reason (such as reimbursement) to reach a
compromise, he could drag the judicial proceedings out until the
wife is no longer able to make payments. Thus, she might settle
for a less than beneficial agreement just to get out from under the
massive debt of which she has assumed sole payment, with no
hope of reimbursement. A court should not subject the spouse
paying the debt to this unfair disadvantage. By requiring
reimbursement, the spouse paying the community debt will be
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refunded half the payments made with separate property and will
not be disadvantaged for purposes of settlement.
Third, if the wife were making payments in their entirety and
thereby further increasing home equity, half of which would be
dispersed to the husband upon the eventual partition of the home,
the husband would have the unfair advantage of benefiting from
these payments without making reimbursement contributions.
Equity is the difference in amount between the fair market value of
the home and the unpaid balance on its mortgage.' 77 When the
wife pays off the outstanding balance on the mortgage, she is,
thereby, increasing the equity in the home. By not having to
contribute to the payments through reimbursement, the husband
will derive the benefit of the equity in the home without
supplementing the payments. Louisiana advocates equal division
of property upon divorce. 178 Under no circumstances could it be
considered equal or even equitable for the wife to solely contribute
to the equity of the home and the husband to reap the benefit
without having to reimburse.
Allowing reimbursement for post-termination, pre-partition
payments would not only conform to the Louisiana principles
favoring equal distribution upon divorce. Requiring a husband to
make reimbursement for half of the mortgage payments post-
termination of the marriage would also discourage him from
delaying judicial resolution of the spouses' property dispute. This
interpretation of article 2365 will encourage swift judicial
settlements.
Equity and fairness will be furthered because the party paying
the debt on property that is still jointly owned would be
reimbursed. Neither equity nor policy support the view that one
should be forced to bear the entire debt for something partially
owned by another just because the payments were made post-
termination but pre-partition, because he has exclusive use, or
because it is a depreciating asset. Finally, this interpretation most
177. The Federal Reserve Board, When Your Home Is on the Line: Glossary,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/HomeLine/glossary.htm#equity (last viewed
Aug. 14, 2007).
178. Spaht, supra note 26, at 296.
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strictly adheres to the language of Article 2365 and the spirit of the
law governing reimbursement as a whole.
4. Correct Treatment in Prior Distinction Theory Cases
Although the timing of payment issue has only been expressly
addressed by the first and third circuits, several courts have applied
article 2365 correctly on this point in dicta. In cases that
mistakenly apply the distinction theory, the courts still allowed
reimbursement for payments made post-termination. Their
mistake lies in the fact that they added additional requirements
based on the type of property related to the obligation. This was
the true error, not their findings on timing of payment. For
example, in Davezac v. Davezac, the fourth circuit found that the
former husband was entitled to reimbursement for mortgage
payments made on the family home after the termination of the
marriage. 179 Though the court erroneously applied the distinction
theory, it still allowed the post-termination, pre-partition payment
to be reimbursed. The fifth circuit in Gachez v. Gachez180 came to
a similar result. The court found that the husband was entitled to
reimbursement for all payments made after the dissolution of the
marriage.18  Once again, the court mistakenly incorporated the
distinction theory as an additional requirement; however, it
correctly allowed reimbursement even though the payment was not
made during the marriage. These cases demonstrate that refusing
reimbursement simply because payment was not made during the
existence of the community is an absurd interpretation not even
employed by cases using the flawed distinction theory. Therefore,
even if Louisiana courts or the legislature act to correct the
distinction theory, the theory allowing post-termination, pre-
partition payments remains a part of the Louisiana jurisprudence.
IV. PROBLEM SOLVED
The Louisiana courts should reevaluate their scattered opinions
interpreting Civil Code article 2365. These courts should conclude
179. 483 So. 2d 1197, 1198 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).




that the party who pays a community debt with separate funds
must be reimbursed regardless of the classification of the property
underlying the community debt as long as payment was made
before the partition of the community property. Serious error is
perpetuated both in drawing a property distinction between an
obligation related to movables and one related to immovables, and
in maintaining that reimbursement is only available for payments
made during the existence of the community. The distinction
based on the nature of the property subject to the obligation is
clearly not within the language of article 2365 nor is it supported
by any logical interpretive methodology. Therefore, this theory
must be discarded.
Further, refusing to allow reimbursement for post-termination,
pre-partition payments on community obligations with separate
funds conflicts with the language of the Civil Code and creates
numerous practical problems for equal division upon divorce.
Courts must allow reimbursement for post-termination payments
of a community obligation as long as the property and, therefore,
ownership, has not yet been divided. This approach provides
equity and fairness between the parties and strictly adheres to the
language and spirit of the Louisiana Civil Code. It is, therefore,
the optimal and most reasonable solution.
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